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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON A VERY MATERIAL ISSUE
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.
POINT II
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS
FULLY INSURED; AND THE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
THE AGREEMENT IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AHD THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED;
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PREEXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE).
POINT III
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS rs. INCURRED.
POINT IV
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR CHEVROLET
ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES
CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE.
POINT V
THE GENERAL AGENT, REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS TO
THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY.
POINT VI
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to replevy a new Chevrolet
automobile purchased under a Conditional Sales Contract.
The contract provided for disability and life insurance.
The Buyers cross-complained

ag~inst

the insurance company

by reason of a total disability (kidney failure).

The

Insurance Company refused payment on the grounds of a unilateral clause alleging a pre-existing condition.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to a Jury in the form of
a Special Verdict..

The Jury hung on the material Interro-

gatory five to three in the car buyer's
favor.

(defendant~s)

The trial Judge, Dean E. Conder, denied defendants'

motion for Judgment on the Verdict and/or defendants' motion
for a new trial.

The trial Court further granted a directed

Verdict in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation
and Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated on the Conditional Sales Contract.

From the denial of these motions

the defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, file
this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a Judgment against the Great Equity
Life Insurance Company in the amount of the balance due on
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the Conditional Sales Contract or an order granting a New
Trial by reason of the hung Jury Verdict.
MATERI~L

FACTS OF THE CASE

On the 12th of September, 1978, Hector Martinez,
age 19, purchased a Chevrolet automobile from Streator Chevrolet

Compa~y,

Incorporated.

By reason of the Conditional

Sales Contract, Hector Martinez also purchased a life insurance policy and paid a premium therefore in the amount
of $97.40; said contract also acknowledged and provided for
the purchase of disability, accident and health insurance
and paid a premium therefore i-n the amount of $189.81.

The

Conditional Sales Contract did provide that should Hector
Martinez die or become totally disabled that· the Great Equity
Life Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois would pay off
the contract in

i~s

entirety, to wit:

the sum of $5,995.00.

The Conditional Sales Contract is annexed hereto as Exhibit
"A" and by reference made a part of this brief.

The Condi-

tional Sales Contract was assigned by Streator Chevrolet
Company, Incorporated, forthwith and immediately to General
Motors Acceptance Corporation.

Payments were faithfully made

by H.ector Martinez as provided by the Conditional Sales Con-tract up to and including November 19, 1978.

On this

day, Hector Martinez entered the University of Utah Hospital with lung congestion and on this date the doctors at
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the hospital diagnosed a complete kidney failure and determined that Hector Martinez, as a result thereof, was completely disabled; claims under the policy were promptly filed.
On or about July 12, 1979, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, filed a complaint herein seeking to replevy a Chevrolet automobile from Hector Martinez alleging
that Hector Martinez was eight months delinquent in payments
under the contract.

Hector Martinez, who had been complete-

ly disabled for the eight month period, to wit:

from Novem-

ber 19, 1978 to July 12, 1979, cross-complained against the
Great Equity Life Insurance Company and Streator Chevrolet
Company, Incorporated, and counterclaimed against General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, a New York corporation, alleging that he was entitled to the benefits of the disability
insurance as provided in the Contract, he having become disabled, the contract was to be completely paid by the Great
Equity Life Insurance Company.

The Great Equity Life Insur-

ance Company admitted that there was insurance contracted
and paid for, commencing September 12, 1978, but alleged
that they were entitled to retroactively void the insurance
coverage after the loss was incurred by reason of a uni1 a teral clause pertaining to pre-existing conditions.

-3-
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Hector Martinez relied on the coverage as was
set out in the Conditional Sales Contract, which is as
follows:
,. .... "',t.J ..

Address

a~d

?SUjer (and C;Buyer)-Name. and Address (lncl.ude-County

\-...!..

\'- . ~ :. .,. _

~. ~·~

' ·. \ . .

\.

,

Seller-Name and Address

Zip Code)

!

S~ CmtVltOLET COMP.AB!
HJ.DI at Sth SODTB

\

SAI.T

... _

"I...

...

:".

I.An

CITY9 UllB 84lll

~

The seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purchases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the reverse side h
the following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.:
New or Used

Year Model

No. Cyl.

Make Trade Name

Body Type -

Vehicle Identification No.

Model No. or Serles

If Truck,. Give GVW

·,·
I

I

'\

..

\

~

·.

·.

..
\

~

'

J

\

t'

If truck-Describe bodies and, major items of equipment sold-

th~ purchase of said property is primarily for personal, family or house hold ~, agricultural 0, business (other than agricultural) O use (check one).
1. CASH PRICE (including any accessories~e/.rv.~CE!J_,!~d t~xes imposed on the cash sale) .-:;:-•• \ ............................................. $
4500.00
1
2. TOTALDOWNPAYMENT-Trade-in
~·•;1'1. . .A
$
·n-tl- $
?ts«• $
n.a, plus$ lOOQ.00 $ lQM 0 QQ

al

lSIJ0.00

{3)

Buyer represents that

1

!.

1

I Make, Model, Yeir

Gross Trade-in
Allowanca

:. (Payoff· made by
seller)

Trade-in (Met)

Cuh Downpayment

3. UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Difference between Items 1and2) ................................................................ $
4. OTHER CHARGES
*A. Cost of Required Physical Damage Insurance ................................................................................ ; ......
**8. Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance ........................................................,...........................
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED.
C. Cost of Creditor Insurance Ior the term hereof.
COVERAGE OF THE BUYER BY ANY SUCH INSURANCE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER.
CHECK CIEDITOI
*** !'.] Life ........••......••.•.......•••....•.•..•...•••••.•.....................•.....
INSURANCE DESIRED
t!J Disability (Accident and Health) ..•...••...•.......•...•..•.•.....................
701 TP..! TE!M t!EIE01'
O Other (describe) ................... :............................................

(1)

$--~:~a....,__!4~

$

:.a.

!4!

$
$

97.,0
1S9.Sl

(4C
14c

$

n.

a1

!4C

BUYER'S APPROVAL: I olstRE. TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE.

9/1?/78
(Date)

D. Official Fees (Describe) ••••••••••.•.••••••.•.. SAlJ!S . .:?AX......... ... .. ... . .. .. . . . . .. .. .. . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . . . .. .. $
215 0 00 14t
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize) ...•...•.....•.•...•.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•.•.• $
S 0 50 14f
F. Certificate,.of Title Fee •.•••••••••.••••••••••••.••..••••...•••••• -:.............................................................. $_ _.n:a.--14f
G. Other (De~ribe) •...•••••••••••••.••••••••.•
?.U. ..................................................................'._. $
14G
5. UNPAID BALA. CE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of items 3 and 4) ...................................................................... ~"$
~023 1 471 (~
6. Fl:~ANCE C~ARGE ............. ·.... ~ ........................................•••....•••......••.............•................... $
9£6.79--'.~
7. TOTAL OF PAYMENTS (Sum of items.5 and 6) ...................................... , ................................................. $.· 499S.C'l -·tn

1.so

ooc•..

8. DEPERRED PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items l, 4 and 6) ................................................................................ $
9. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE ......................................................................·.........................

5995.00 _:8)
14 5S.%(~l

10. PAYMENT SCHEDULE: The Total of Payments (Item 7) is payable at seller's office designated below or at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in..JA..
!nstalments of $
l 16 • 75
each, commencing
1.Qf12==
· • 192!\_• and on the same· day of each successive month thereafter • or as indicat~
in space below.
.
.

'.
-'t,...-\.
\1"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
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The certificate of insurance named General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, a New ~ork corporation, as the ~reditor
beneficiary and provided that should Hector Martinez, age 19,
die or become disabled during the term of the Conditional
Sales ·Contract that the Great Equity Life Insurance Company
would pay the Conditional Sales Contract of and in its entirety.

The Certificate further provided that the term of insur-

ance would commence as of September 12, 1978 and would expire
on the maturity date of the indebtedness subject to acceptance
by the insurer and within thirty days there would be delivered to Hector Martinez a certificate of insurance more fully
describing the insurance.

No policy of insurance was ever

delivered. No notice of acceptance or rejection of Hector
Martinez as an insured was given within the thirty days.

No

premium was ever returned to Hector Martinez. (Tr.-163) (Tr.-170)
Eight months after Hector Martinez was disabled
by kidney failure, to wit:

On July 12, 1979, the Great Equity

Life Insurance Company denied coverage under the insurance
certificate claiming that Hector Martinez has a pre-existing
condition, to wit:

High blood pressure, which permitted

them to retroactively void the policy after the loss had been
incurred.
Dr. Duffy testified that high blood pressure was
non-symptomatic (a silent killer) and that Hector Martinez
would not be aware of the ensuing kidney failure (Tr.-43).
-5-
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In this regard, the Court submitted to the Jury a special
Interrogatory and the Jury by a five to three vote found
that Hector Martinez did not know nor should he have known
of the pre-existing physical condition exclusion referred
to in the insurance policy.

Other Interrogatories were pre-

sented to the Jury to which there was no dispute, to wit:
Did the Disability policy have a preexisting condition exclusion . . . ?
This was undisputed.
Did Hector Martinez have an injury or
illness for which medical diagnosis or
treatment was required?
This was undisputed.
Did the injury or sickness of Mr. Martinez
cause a loss within six months after
the effective date of the disability
policy?
This was undisputed.
Did Hector Martinez become totally disabled?
This was not only undisputed but was part of the proof required by Hector Martinez to recover in the case.

The key

question was answered by a majority in Hector Martinez's
favor.
It is undisputed that all insurance premiums were
paid in full (Tr.-20); that the insurance company had thirty
(30) days to accept or reject Hector Martinez as an insured
(See D-25); that coverage was denied eight months after the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

loss occurred without a return of any premium whatsoever. (Tr. -163.)
On July 12, 1979 Hector Martinez was denied coverage under the insurance certificate on the basis that he had
a pre-existing condition and that there was a clause in the
policy that if Hector Martinez had a pre-existing condition
that the insurance company could void the policy.
On November 19, 1978, Hector Martinez was admitted
to the University of Utah Hospital with lung congestion
at which time he suffered a complete kidney failure and
became fully and completely disabled.
The Jury by a five to three vote found that Hector
Martinez did not know nor should he have known of the preexisting physical condition exclusion referred to in the
insurance policy.

Irrespective of this, Judge Dean E.

Conder_entered Judgment of No Cause of Action in favor of
the insurance company and against Hector Martinez.
The general agent, Rex Elton, testified that he
made no inquiries regarding the health of Hector Martinez
(Tr~l61,

Tr.-156).

He further testified that there was no

fraud or deception of any type or nature by the insured
(Tr.~155)

and that he had no memory of any delivery of a

certificate of insurance

to

Hector Martinez (Tr .....156) (-See

also Tr. -169) .
When the insurance company denied coverage, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation filed an action in replevin
-7-
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in which they sought to immediately recover possession of
the 1977 Chevrolet automobile.

The finance company also

sued for a deficiency judgment and extensive attorney's
fees.

The defendants, by third-party complaint made the

Great Equity Life Insurance Company a third-party defendant and counterclaimed against General Motors Acceptance
Corporation on the grounds that the finance company was a
direct assignee of Streator Chevrolet and on the further
ground that the finance company was the beneficiary under
the insurance policy and as such had accepted payments and
premiums and by reason of the assignments, the documents,
the insurance policy, that the finance company was equally
liable.
Motors

Judge Conder directed a verdict in favor of General
Acceptanc~

Corporation, and from this order the

defendants appeal.
It is undisputed that the Great Equity Life Insurance Company accepted a good and sufficient premium; that
they led Hector Martinez to honestly believe that he was
fully and completely covered; that they failed to make the
insurance certificate available to Hector Martinez or to
inform him of the contents and that he was unaware of any
clause·by which the insurance company

~ould

unilaterally

declare the policy void until after the loss had been
incurred.

By not informing Hector Martinez of their accep-

tance or rejection as an insured within thirty (30) days

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as provided in the certificate, and the contract having been
completed in good faith, the insurance was in full force
and effect when the loss occurred.

The Great Equity Life

Insurance Company having plead an exception or exclusion
as a defense, they had the burden of persuasion and the
burden of proof to sustain their position.

The Jury by a

five to three vote found that they did not sustain their
burden of proof and the Court should have granted a mistrial
in favor of Hector Martinez.
Rex Elton failed and refused to ask Hector Martinez any questions whatesoever concerning his health even
though there was a Buyer's Age Statement and Health Declara-.
tion as set forth in the Conditional Sales Contract:
IUYEl~·s· ACE STlT'EMEMT AHO HOl TH D£CURAT10H (.&~labia When 1 Cb3r11 Hu Sea Arathcrind ta ~c Um md
las:n::a Uadct Pr.t~!IJI Groa11 Hr, GL·3SO :.S ~zad).
Ap !:st !1ir1h~y c! gGy!t PT!l(:csed fer Ul1 li:..~r:ir.al [j Ua:J.:r 6S
I, tbe e11yu P~~ for Ufl lc:r=a, aadmtmd 1h2t !ht im:~n~ is ccrly 1'1111atM lo a lmyer wh= mJU11h1 I01"ia..flnt da:f.,.tio_ns
ta lad11:a Prudent!~ ta c:!t:1 m:lt ln~r..::i: I d12 hm!ly t!etian t!:Jf '111thir. th: µ:1 rtm r.tc::iths (1) Ihm nal c:nsi:!tz~ or bten anucr
Ula C21 at a t!a:tar ar atl!tr llS'Xtilia:iu fat c.:r.::r, 211d (Z) I hm act ~eu ci:n~ned le 1 n~!lf f1f at~:r intit:itl.>11 ~ase al lay
cnditfaa of the hclrt, !:ni•, lher. klt!:icys or ''DfS. I hen!Jy utllwrus my 'h~~ er ha::;i!al ta '1:!:s1 l• Pr:t!::iti4! ~ lala::utloa
mannii111 my media history '11ar to th• d111 af this murzt.
s1c11111n

~~------........
.....,.---:--=-~-----:-:"~~~~~----~(Si1111lur•
ol Buyer Prooosed tor Ufe lnsuranct)

In addition thereto, there evidently was issued
a life insurance and disability insurance certificate which
Rex Elton had no·memory of ever delivering to Hector Martinez and in addition thereto he had no recollection of ever
mailing same to Hector Martinez. (Tr . ..,..150) (Tr.--157)

-9-
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.

Tht Signerb} of the contract hereby take(s) notic1 that grol.lp credit life insuranca coverage and/or group credit accident ar.d haa! th insuran:a covera~e wi
bt applicable to this can tract if '10 mark ad an tha front of the contract and each such type of covu:tge wiil be written by tha insur:inca company !13mt
above. This insurance, subject to acceptance by the insurer covers only the personfal signing the request for such insurance. The amount of charg:i is indic~t 1
for each typa of credit insurance to bt purchased. The term of insurance will commence as of the data the indebtedness is incurred and will expira or! tn
date 15 days after the original scheduled maturity data of the indebtedness. Subiect to acceptance by the insurer and within 30 days tnera wj!l !le ..ia•iwe
ta the insured debtor a certificate of insurance more fully describing the insurance. in the event of prepayment cf tne indebtedness, a refund of inn:t3n:
charges will bt made when due.
Witness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Cate _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Applicznt

I Ca-Signer

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON A VERY MATERIAL ISSUE
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.
POINT II ..
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS
FULLY INSURED; AND TtlE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
THE AGREEMENT IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AND THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED;
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PREEXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE).
POINT III
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS IS INCURRED.
-10-
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POINT IV
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR
CHEVROLET ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE.
POINT V
THE GENERAL AGENT, REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS
TO THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY.
POINT VI
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.

~-11~
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POINT I
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON
A

A

VERY MATERIAL ISSUE

NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The Jury found by a 5 to 3 vote in favor of Hector

Martinez and against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company (the insurance company failed to sustain their burden
of proof) in the following particulars:
Interrogatory No. 2:

Did Hector Martinez

know or should he have known of the pre-existing physical
condition exclusion referred to in question 1.
Yes

3

No

5

Great Equity's principal witness was Rex Elton,
car salesman, insurance agent and employee of Streator
Chevrolet Company

(Tr.~146),

who testified as follows:

Q:

Do you recall dealing with Hector
Martinez, the gentleman behind me--

A:

No, sir. (Tr.-150)

Q:

If I understand you right you have no
memory of waiting on Hector Martinez
at all.

A:

That's correct.

Q:

No memory of him being in your office?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

And if I understand you further the
best of your recollection, no questions
regarding health of any type or nature
were asked of Hector Martinez?
-12-
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A:

That~s

Q:

You did evidently handle the execution
of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Did you have Hector Martinez sign any type
of an application for insurance with Great
Equity Insurance Company?

A:

Only thing they signed is on the Condi~
tional Sales Contract.
(Tr.-157)

Q:

You don't know whether or not a policy of
insurance was mailed to him or not do you?

A:

I can only tell you what is normally done.
(Tr.-158)

Q:

You never asked Hector Martinez if he had
(a pre-existing condition)?

A:

No, sir. (Tr.-161)

Q:

He looked healthr to you, didn't he?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

You were happy to insure
money? Isn't that true?

A:

Yes, sir. (Tr.-161)

Q:

Well, as an agent, didn't you receive a
commission for

Mr. Hansen:

correct.

(Tr.-157)

h~m·and

take his

Raise the same objection.

Mr. Miner:
I think it's admissible, your
Honor.
Goes to his credibility, and
bias and prejudice.
The Court:

I don't think so.

Sustained.

Mr. Miner:
It was to your advantage to sell
this particular policy to Hector Martinez
monetarily?
-13-
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Mr. Hansen:
The Court:

Same form of question really.
Sustained. (Tr.-159)

Q:

Do you know whether or not there was ever
any refund of any premium to Hector Martinez,
of your own knowledge?

A:

No, sir.

The Jury found in favor of Hector Martinez and
against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company that the
policy·of insurance was never delivered to Hector Martinez,
and therefore he did not know and could not know of the
pre-existing condition exclusion existing in the policy.
The legal effect of the Jury's findings are:
(a)

That where the insured has no knowledge

of a condition which would render a policy voidable, and
(b)

Where the general agent, who has complete

knowledge of the voidable condition fails to advise the
applicant of the condition, and
(c)

In addition thereto, where the general

agent fails and refuses to ask any questions concerning the
applicant's health, and
(d)

Where the agent failed and refused to

fill out or ask any of the questions set forth on the Conditional Sales Contract, and
(e)

Where the agent testified that there

were no false representations of any type or nature on the
part of Hector Martinez, and
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(f)

Where the general agent issues a policy

in good faith and specifically agrees that there was no intent to deceive or to misrepresent any facts on the part of
the insured, the Great Equity Life Insurance Company under
the law, will not be permitted to avoid coverage under the
·policy.

(See Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of Amer-

ica, 16 Utah 2d 52, 54-55, 395 P.2d 724 (1964).
POINT II
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS
FULLY INSURED; AND THE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
THE AGREEMEi{T IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AND THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED;
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PREEXISTING PHYSICIAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE).
The Great Equity Life Insurance Company intended
to execute the insurance policy affording Hector Martinez
the coverage purchased; and, the policy issued contained a
condition rendering it voidable from its inception.

This

was known to the general agent and the insurance company.
Under Utah law it is presumed that the Great Equity Life
Insurance Company intended to issue a valid policy.
further

It is

presumed that the insurance company was informed
-15-
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of all facts concerning the coverage requested and purchased.
Under these facts the policy must be enforced as a valid
policy.

The law clearly states that where the insurance

company by their actions and conduct induced the insured
(Hector Martinez) to act to his detriment, then and in that
event, the law denies the insurance company the legal effect
to a provision of the policy inserted for the benefit or
protection of the insurer.

(See, Manufacturer

& Merchants

Indemnity Company vs. Claman, 96 F. Supp. 385 (D. Iowa 1951);
Hully vs. Aluminum Company of America, 143 F. Supp. 508

(D. Iowa 1956); Standard Accident Insurance Company vs.
Roberts, 130 F. 2d 794 (8th Cir. Ark. 1942); Fidelity National
Bank vs. Central Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company
48 So. 2d 668 (La Appellate 1950); Stokes vs. American Cent.
Insurance Company, 211 Miss. 584, 52 So. 2d 358 (1951).
There was an agreement on the part of Rex Elton,
the general agent of the Great Equity Life Insurance Company,
to issue an insurance policy on the life of Hector Martinez
and to provide disability insurance, health and accident,
for Hector Martinez as set forth below:

I

COVERAGE OF

c:~:KB~::D~:a: ANY SUCH '~:~R;c~i~! .~~~. ~.[.~~~~~.~.;~~ .~~~~~~: ................................................. $·-.-:9::i..7s.-.. . t.~o,._(4Cl
.
.\

INSURANCE DESIRED

YOlt TRE

TERM nmu:or

t!J Disability (Accident and Health) ..................................................

D

$

other (describe)................................................................ $

BUYER'S APPROVAL: I otslRE TO OBTAIN THE. CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED. ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE.
•.
.. .
. l
·-•
Slraatare / , ·J · ~;i.,
,-/·-,·1 , / ·r.-· · " --~ .,, .

tj./]?/78
(Date)

~/ '..._~•V<./vt/Y

,-

1!n\.V

l.'<>l-'J

(Buyer's Sl1n1ture)

~ .•

J- -::..~ :-·; . .

~-------------r)
(Co· Buyer's Si&nature)
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l S9.Sl

n.".

(4Cl
(4Cl

Rex Elton failed and refused to ask Hector Martinez any questions whatsoever, concerning his health eventhough there was a Buyer's Age Statement and Health Declaration as

s~t

forth in the Conditional Sales Contract:

IUYER"S ACE ST.lT£MEHT AHO HE.ll TH DECUR.lTIOH (Ai;llntltt Wl'len a C:t3flt Hu Beo Aatbmim fl 4C .lbm 1U
lmnm Uader PruClfttla GroaJ Palley GL·llO Is Pnl!lmd).
A1112Sl binb~y a( B::yu Prn!:as&d far Utt ln.•1:rla'l'Cll O Ua:er 6S
I, ti'.& 811ytr P~d for U?! l:::r::t. oadmt~d th:t th1 l=r.ncs Is cey mil~tie 11 a lnmr ""a cui!s !ht loftiiWinf dacbntlans
It lldaca Pru~tlJI l; el!=t mcll lns:ru:i: I da hmby d!Ci.n t:UI ltilhin th1 ;asr r~r:: r.cntt:s (l) Ihm nat =ns:.1rn ar b!tn ondct
~tilia:u far uuu, 111d (l) I hn' a:Jt heta confined le i l'I~!~ at olh:t hsstiflltl.» !:!aim ol 1ny
of the he:rt. !:nia, !her, lldneys cr IHft. I llereby 211tll.wi my Jhr:;W: ::r ha:;:it.i la ~.don It Prldr.t~ ~ l:l~m~ti=
cnurni:-i my mcdicll history piicr to Iha dJtc of lllfs cautrxL

Ult C2'1 gt a da::tcr ar a!h!r

c:udi!!:J~

Slt•1tv1

og-~---------.------..--~---,..,~~--------------(Sic111lutt al 811ywr Prooosad lot UI• •nsunna)

In addition thereto, there evidently was issued
a life insurance and disability insurance certificate which
Rex Elton had no memory of ever delivering to Hector Martinez and in addition .thereto, he.had no recollection of
ever mailing same to Hector Martinez.

(In fact he had no

memory of the transaction at all).
Tht Sign1r(s) of tht contract hereby take(s) notice that group credit life insurance cavera91 and/or group credit accident and health insuranc1 c12ven;1 w:li
bt 1pplicabl1 to this contract if-sa marked an the front of tht contract and each such t'VP• of coverage will bt written bv tht insuranca cam:any name:
tbave. This insurance, subject ta acteptanca by tha insurer coven onlv tha person(sl signing the request far suth _1Murancs. Tha amount or cnargs is indi:3~1:
far ttcn type af credit insuranc1 ta be purchased. Tha term of insurance will commence as af the data the inc2btedness is inc1.:rred and will ex~ire O:? ~:u
d1t1 15 days after the original scheduled maturity data of the indebtedness. Subject ta acceptance by the insunnnd within 30 days, mere will b! :a!irn·?::
ta the insured debtor a certificate oi insuranc! more fully describing the insuranca. in the event of prepayment af the indebtedneu, a refund of in~unr.:1
ctsar~es will be made when due.
Applicant _________________ Witness - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - D • t • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Co·Si9ner ____________________________

From the foregoing it is obvious that Hector
Martinez was never requested to sign the certificate nor did
he sign it, and as the Jury so found:

Hector Martinez did

not Know nor should he have known of the pre-existing physical condition exclusion referred to in the policy.
-17-
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The premium was paid.
(Tr.-163).

No refund was ever made.

The policy by its very terms gave the Insurance

company the right to terminate the policy within thirty days
if it concluded that Hector Martinez was not acceptable.
The Company failed to act within the specified thirty day
period--this is tantamount to the acceptance of Hector Martinez as an insured--under these circumstances the company
cannot be permitted to void the policy eight months after
the loss occurred.
Good faith on all contracting parties is admitted.
No deception was alleged or proven.
ly believed he was properly insured.

The policy holder honestHector Martinez was

not aware of any kidney failure (Tr.-43).
to believe he was properly insured.

He was induced

To permit the insurance

company to assert a voidable clause eight months after the
loss occurred would be in defiance of the established law.
The Great Equity Life.Insurance Company having
plead an exception or exclusion as a defense, they had the
burden of persuasion and the burden of proof to sustain their
position.

The Jury by a five to three vote found that they

did not sustain their burden of proof and the Court
have

~hould

granted a mistrial in favor of Hector Martinez.

-18-
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POINT III
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS IS INCURRED.
It was stipulated and agreed and conclusively
shown that Rex Elton is a general agent of the Great Equity
Life Insurance Company and as such he was given broad and
general power (a) to accept risks, (b) bind insurer, (c) to
fix an extra premium for hazardous risks, and (d) to collect
premiums and issue policies.

(See Phenix Insurance Company

vs. Munger, 49 Kan. 178, 30 P. 120 (1892); Stephan vs. Mutual
Benefit Health and Accident Association, 146 Kan. 307, 69
P. 2d 694 (1937); Maynard vs. National Fire Insurance Company,
147 W. _Va. 589, 129 S.E. 2d 443 (1963).
In this regard Rex Elton, as a general agent was
duty bound to make such inquiries and to ask the necessary
questions to provide dector Martinez with proper insurance
concerning his life and disability.

It was the general

agent's duty to ascertain whether or not Hector Martinez
was insurable and to provide him with the proper policy.
(~ee

Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of America, 16

Utah 2d 56).
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that
a general insurance agent is held to the standard of a
-19-
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reasonable prudent insurance agent and as such he cannot
"blind himself from ascertaining the truth and then provide
the applicant with a policy of insurance which can unilaterally be declared void by reason of the agent's failure to
ascertain from the applicant the status of his health"; he
is required to investigate the health and condition of the
applicant; he is required to determine whether or not the
applicant is insurable

under the policy; and, where the

agent failed and refused to do so, under Utah law, it is
presumed that he did .-so.
1~21.

(See, Couch on Insurance, Sect ion

See also, New York Life Insurance Company vs. Strudel,

· 5 Cir. 243, Fed. 2d 90; Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 54-55, 395 P. 2d 724 (1964);
Marks vs. Continental Casualty Company, 19 Utah 2d 119, 122,
427 P. 2d 387 (1967).
In Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of
America, supra, our Supreme Court specifically held that
an applicant for insurance is not required to volunteer
information about his health and by reason of the agent's
superior position that the general agent is required to ascertain all facts that are needed to issue the policy.
In this regard, the general agent of the Great
Equity Life Insurance Company did lead Hector Martinez to

.

honestly believe that he was covered with a good and sufficient life insurance policy and a disability insurance policy
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and by reason thereof Hector Martinez has suffered great and
serious damage in that he did not obtain other insurance and
the insurance that was issued to him is now being unilaterally declared void.

Had Rex Elton, the general agent of the

insurance company, made known to Hector Martinez the contents
of the insurance policy or had he delivered t6 Hector.Martinez a copy of the policy, as was reguired, Hector Martinez
would then have.been in a position to reject the policy and
to obtain insurance elsewhere.
It is undisputed that the Great Equity Life Insurance Company accepted a good and sufficient premium; they
led Hector Martinez to honestly believe he was fully an:d
completely covered apd by doing so and by their failure to
make the policy available to Hector Martinez or to inform
him of th.e contents thereof, under Utah law there was deliberate, wilful conduct and statements on tbe part of the
insurance company which caused Hector Martinez to reasonably
believe. th.at he was insured and they thereby induced him to
act in the belief th.at h.e was insured; and by their deliberate and wilful conduct--they are denied the right of now
asserting that the policy they issued is voidable.
It is the general law, and as such has been adopted
by our Supreme Court, that where the insured has been misled or imposed upon by an insurance company, the conditions
wh.ich l:)rovide for a voidance of the policy and thereby violates
-21-
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the dominant purpose of the insurance should be disregarded
with princely liberality.

The insurance company should be

prevented from asserting the clause whenever necessary to
prevent fraud or injustice from being per_petrated.

(See

Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Bobo,
214 F. 2d. 575 (4th Cir. S.C. 1956); Travelers Fire Insurance Company vs. Robertson, 103 Ga. Appellate 816, 120 S.E.
2d 657 (1961); Mee vs. Bankers Life Association, 69 Minn.
120, 72 N.W. 74 (1897); Bubuque Fire and Marine Insurance
Company vs. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E. 2d 8 (1951).
The insurance company by their deliberate, wilful
conduct and statements caused Hector Martinez to
position to his detriment.

ch~nge

his

(See, Plan vs. Parkview Drugs,

250 Southwest 2d, 181 Mo. Appellate 1952).

The Court's

attention is also called to Farrington ys. Granite State (Utah)
Fire Insurance' 232 Pac' 754' in which our ··Supreme Court held
that an insurance company cannot adopt and take the benefits
of their general agent,. s conduct which is favorable to them
and deny and not be bound by his conduct which is contra to
their benefit.

The insurance company is conclusively charged

with his knowledge and his conduct.

(See also, Turner vs.

Mutual Benefit and Health Insurance, (24 Northwest 2d 534).
The Court's attention is further called to Couch
on Insurance, Section 10:7, which states the general law,
that if the contract has been completed in good faith so
-22-
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that the risk has been commenced the insurance is in effect
as of the date that it was. to issue.

(See, Couch on Insur-

ance, Section 10:7). Both parties contracted in good faith
as of September 12, 1978.

The risk commenced.

was in effect as of that date.

Insurance

The insurance company's

attempt to avoid the policy from the beginning should be
denied in that the agent is charged with investigating the
health of the applicant and it is presumeq that he did so.
(See, Couch on Insurance, Section 11:21).
Delivery is not necessary to place the insurance
in effect.

(See, Prince vs. Western Empire Insurance Com-

pany, 19 Utah 2d, 174, 428 P.2d 163; Ida Long vs. United
Benefit Insurance Company, Incorporated, Supreme Court No.
12844, filed March 8, 1973).

In these cases, our Supreme

Court held that.where an applicant has completed and submitted an application and paid a premium, and a receipt was
issued wnich provides that the effective date of the insurance
is the effective date of the application, a contract of insurance is created, and thereafter an insurance company
cannot terminate the coverage by rejection after a loss has
occurred.

(See also, JoAnn B. Moore vs. Prudential Insurance

Company of America, 26 Utah 2d 430).

In the instant case,

where the Great Equity Life Insurance Company has plead an
exception or exclusion as a defense to the claim asserted by
Hector Martinez, in which they claim a particular loss falls
-23-
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within the exception to the coverage, the insurance company
has a burden of persuasion and a burden of proof on this
issue.

('See Rowland H, Long on the Law of Liability Insur-

ance, Section 26.21, paragraph 5, and the cases cited thereunder:

Gusson vs. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company,

326 Mass. 571, 95 N.E. 2d 670).

In this case the insurance

company completely failed to sustain their burden of proof
on the second question, and Judgment should be rendered in
favor of Hector Martinez or in the alternative, the Court
should grant a mistrial by reason of the Jury's 5 to 3 vote
in favor of Hector Martinez.
The Court's attentions is respectfully called to
Long vs ... United Benefit Insurance Company, _Incorporated, 29
Utah 2d 204, where our Supreme Court properly held that where
an application is filled out by a general agent and the first
payment premium is paid in full, the insurance becomes effective as of the date of the application.

Temporary insurance

coverage is g·iven for the time during which the application
or approval of the application is pending.

The Court will

note that in the application blank (which was never signed
and which was never given to Hector Martinez) it provided that
the Great Equity Life Insurance Company had thirty (30) days
to approve or disapprove the application for insurance.

On

Page 209, Long vs. United Benefit Insurance Company, Incorporated, supra, our Supreme Court went on to say that the
-24-
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company was bound to either act affirmatively or negatively on
the application.

If the insured

was entitled to the policy.

was an acceptable risk, he

if he was not acceptable, the

insurance company was requried to so notify h.im and return the
premium paid, or if rated up notify him by tendering him an
ap~lication

at a high rate.

On the facts in the Long case,

supra, the insured was never notified during his life that
his application was accepted, rejected, or that it would be
considered at a higher premium.

Here the money for the first

premium was retained by the insurance company until after the
insured's death, when tender was made to the beneficiary for
the return of the premium, which he rejected.
case, Hector Martinez paid his premium.

In the instant

He was conclusively

told that he was insured for disability insurance and at
this point the Great Equity Life Insurance Company was under
a duty to act either affirmatively or negatively on the application.

If Hector Martinez was not acceptable the insurance

company was required to notify him and to return the premium
paid, or if rated up, notify him by tendering an application
at a higher rate.

Th.is would have permitted Hector Martinez

to purchase elsewhere and thereby be protected.

The Company,

by failing to act either affirmatively or negatively on the

application denied Hector Martinez of this valuable right.
As in the Long case, the insurance company did not deny
coverage until after the loss had been incurred.
-25-
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Under all cited cases and under our Utah laws, the
Great Equity Life Insurance Company and its general agent
are prevented from taking a legal position prejudicial to
its insured to whom it induced by words or conduct t.o act
to his detriment.

Under this theory the Great Equity Life.

Insurance Company is denied the right to assert the legal
effect of a provision inserted in the policy for the benefit
and protection of the insurance company.

Hector Martinez

was grievously misled and imposed upon by Rex Elton, the
general agent, and by the Great Equity Life Insurance Company.
Their conduct was tantamount to a fraud and a great injustice
to Hector Martinez.
Insurance Company

The Jury so found the Great Equity Life

fail~d

to sustain

their burden of proof

that Hector Martinez knew or should have known of the preexisting physical condition exclusion and by reason thereof
Judgment should be entered in favor of Hector Martinez and
against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company or in the
alternative, the Court should grant a mistrial on the grounds
that the Jury was hung.
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POINT IV .
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR
CHEVROLET ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE.
Rex Elton was admittedly an agent, servant, and
employee of Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated, and
empowered· to fully complete and execute the Conditional
Sales Contract and to complete the sale of the motor vehicle involved in this suit.

The Conditional Sales Contract

was printed and provided by General Motors Acceptance Corporation, in accordance with their instructions and requirements.

Rex Elton was further empowered by General Motors

Acceptance Corporation and Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated to write

insurance-for and on behalf of the

Great Equity Life Insurance Company under a group insurance
policy which the group premiums were paid by Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated and under which General Motors
Acceptance Corporation was a creditor-beneficiary.

Irres-

pective of the foregoing Judge Conder, by his rulings refused to permit defendant, Hector Martinezts, attorney to
show that Rex Elton was biased and prejudiced, in that he
received a commission from the sale of the policy and that
he was acting in·dual capacities. (Tr.-159)
Rex Elton testified that at all times he was acting
as an agent, servant, and employee of Streator Chevrolet
-27Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Company, Incorporated and that he well knew that Streator
Chevrolet Company, Incorporated was the policy holder and
that General Motors Acceptance Corporation was the benefiriiary under the policy.

The Court refused inquiry as to who

paid him his commission and the
assigned as error.

~ount

thereof.

This is

(See also, Group Policy, defendant's

Exhibit 16).
The Conditional Sales Contract was negotiated
forthwith from

St~eator

Chevrolet Company, Incorporated, to

General Motors Acceptance Corporation.

Car payments were made

by Hector Martinez to Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated
for and on. behalf of General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
After Hector Martinez suffered his disability, an insurance
premium and/or car payment of $40.00 was paid directly to
General Motors Acceptance Corporation, the creditor-beneficiary
under the policy.

General Motors Acceptance Corporation saw

fit to interpret the policy and to notify Hector Martinez
that he was not covered under the group policy on or about
July 12, 1979.

(At least a letter to that effect was intro-

duced into evidence).

lTr. Wl , P--JI)

Wh.en General Motors Acceptance Corporation accepted
the Conditional Sales Contract in its entirety and the insurance policy under which they were the creditor-beneficiary
they became bound by all the terms of the contract and by
all th.e terms· and conditions of the group insurance policy
..-28..-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the certificate of insurance.

They were necessary

parties to the entire transactions and became equally
responsible to Hector Martinez under the terms and conditions thereof.
POINT V
THE GENERAL AGENT,. REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS
TO THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY.
Rex Elton testified he had no memory of the execution of the Conditional Sales contract or the issuance
of Insurance.
action.

He denied all knowledge of the $5000.00 trans-

He had no memory

of ever dealing with Hector Mar-

tinez (Tr.-150) (Tr.-151).

This is very hard to comprehend

in that Hector Martinez and Manual M. Rivera were son and
father; several documents were prepared by Elton and executed.

It is submitted that this was a convenient loss of

memory, in order to base a case on custom and usage.

Custom

and usage should not stand against positive evidence testified to by the father and son, both of them were present and
testified, no policy was delivered or explained.

The insurance

company's case was based solely on a no memory premise-this should be reversed.

-29-
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POINT VI
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.
At the· conclusion of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation's case, Jay V. Barney requested the Court
to take under advisement, the issue of attorney's fees and
argued that the issue of attorney's fees was to be determined by the Court and not the Jury.

This Motion was made

at the bench with the Jury sitting in place.

Mark S. Miner

advised Jay V. Barney in the presence of the Court (out of
the hearing distance of the Jury) that the issue of attorney's fees for breach of the contract was an issue for the
Jury and that if Mr. Barney desired to seek attorney's fees
he should proceed with his evidence in the presence of the
Jury and permit the Jury to decide the issue,

Mr. Barney

refused to present any evidence with regard to attorney's
fees.

The record is devoid of any evidence of attorney's

fees,

The matter was never presented to the Jury.

By not

presenting the evidence to the Jury and/or to the Court,
the General Motors Acceptance Corporation waived their right
to attorney,. s fees and none should be

award~d.

(See Peterson

vs. Ohio Copper Company, 71 Utah. 444, 266 P. 2d 1050).
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CONCLUSION
Hector Martinez purchased disability insurance
in good faith.

The Great Equity Life Insurance Company

granted the insurance subject to their acceptance of Hector
Martinez as an insured and agreed that within thirty (30)
days there would be delivered to Hector Martinez, a certificate of insurance.

No policy was ever delivered.

There

was no acceptance or rejection within the thirty-day period.
No premium was ever returned.

The Jury, by a five to three

vote, found in favor of Hector Martinez and against the
Great Equity Life Insurance Company, that Hector Martinez
did not know of any pre-existing physical
ing in the policy.

condition exist-

The· policy was issued in good faith;

Hector Martinez relied upon the policy.

Under these circum-

stances the insurance company should not be permitted to
void the policy eight months after the loss occurred.

The

insurance company failed to sustain their burden of proof
and judgment should be rendered against them and the policy
enforced or in the alternative a new trial should be granted
by reason of the hung jury.
Respectfully submitted,

Hector Martinez
M. Rivera
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants, Hector Martinez and
Manuel M. Rivera to:
Jay V .. Barney, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
General Motors Acceptance Corporation
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
William J. Hansen, Esq.
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants
Great Equity Life Insurance Company
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and that said Brief was duly served according to law on
this

c1.~

day of

~

, 19 /'/, postage

prepaid.
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s0 ely for the disclosure purposes of the Consumer Credit Protecticri Act.
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Seller-!'fa:::a and Address

\

STRJ:Al'OJ. CBEVltOLET CO-dPANY
HAD.I at ·Sth SOOTH

SALT LAn CITY, UTAH 84111

I ;

It seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purc~ases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the reverse side bererl,
II following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.:
1trorU11d Year Model

No. Cyl.

Make Trade Name

...

Body Type -

If Truck,_Give GVW

Vehicle Identification No.

Model No. or Serles

·•

I

i

•.
\

'

'

'.

·.

tt lrllck-Describe bodies and, major items of equipment sold-

~

'

·.

.

\

\

J

\

i .

'

.,

·.,.,represents that th~ purchase of said property is primarily for personal, family or house ho~~· agricultural D. business (other than agricultural) 0 use (check one).
; L CASH PRICE (including any accessories, servJces and taxes imposed on the cash sale) •·.. . ..\ ..... . ............... ; ....................... . $
4500.00

~/f,{""'.1/i...\

(1)

]nno.oo
$
C..sh Oownpayment

1000.00

(2)

1 UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Difference between Items 1 and 2) ............................... . ...... . ............. . ......... . . $
t OTHER CHARGES
•A. Cost of Required Physical Damage l11surance . ..........•... . .... . ......... . ..•.. . ... . . . .. . ... •.... . . . ...... . .. -~ .. •.. . .. .. · · · · · · · · · $
**S. Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance .... .. ... ..... ........ .. .................................... . ... .. ........ · .. · .. · .. $
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED.
C. Cost of Creditor Insurance for the term hereat.
COVERAGE Of THE BUYER BY AHY SUCH INSURANCE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER.
CHECK CIEDITDI
*** rJ:] Life .... . ..........·. .... . ........ . ... .. .. .. ... .. . . ......... . ....... . .. . ........ $
INSUUNCE DESIRED
l!l Disability (Accident and Health). . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • $
FOi TF..E
1!El.E0'1
O Other (describe) .......... . ...... . . .'. .... .. . ... .. ................ . ........... . .. $

3500.00

(3)

It

I

TOTALDOWNPAYMENT-Trade·in

;_

·

·

I Make, Model.

$

Year

· n.11. $

Gron Trad•·in
Allowance

'·!IX.a. $

'• (Payoff· made by

" ··"·

Trade· in (Itel)

plus$

seller)

1'a a.

(4Al
!4B)

u.a.

97.£0

!4Cl
!4Cl
!4Cl

lS9.S1

MM

1'!I •I!•

IUYER'S APPROVAL: I ols1RE TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE.
.

g/] ?/78
(Date)

,.

.

.

..

-~.

Sl111t1ra/. I -~ Y', ·
~ /
.._ -:'.c_......t. ' ""v

f·rl

1 •
.... I/ , ,· .,-\ .-\

G
l

, -,

(Buyer's Slcnaturtf

... ...-·

\. ~-..

\
• ~ - ; __
.. . r~..

~--------------7=)
(Co-Buyer's Si1n1ture)

D. OfficialFees(Describe) ••..•••... •••..••••..•• SALES ..?AX ........ .... ............ ....................... ..... ............ .. $
'?15.00 !401
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize)........... . ...... . . . ............... . .. . .... . . . ... . ................................ . .... $
S. 50 (4El
F. Certificate.of Title Fee ••.••••..•. ••••••••••••••••••••....••••••• ~.'.............................................................. S---n.cl..-(4f)
G. Other(Oe~cribe) ... . ........................ l)OC •.. ?.tt .... .......... ......... .......................................... :.. $
7.~0
(4GJ
i. UNPAID BALA~CE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of items 3 and 4) .••.•...• •.•..•• •..••• •.•• •••••. ••.•• ••.••...••...•.. •. . .•........• • •.\$
lt023 a2l (5)

l Fl:!ANCE C~ARGE .................. : ............ ... .............. ....... .. .............. ............................ ........... S . 956.7-9--:6)
1. TOTALOFPAYMENTS(Sumofitems.Sand6) ............ . ...... . ...... . .. . ....... -r-··········· ············ ······· ·············· ···· $. 4995.':'0 -.(7)

D~ERRED

l

PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items 1, 4 and 6) ...... . .................... . .. . ................. . ........................ .. ..... $

5935 .ca

:. 8)

14. 55 3

t ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE . .. . ... .. ........ .... .... ........ .•.. .. .. .. .. ................ ... ........... .. .. .. .... . .. .. .....

(9)

I~ PAYMENT

SCHEDULE: The Total o( Payments (Item 7) is payable at seller's office designated below or at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in-3.L
instalments of$
l 18 • 75
each, commencing
l.Qfl2=
, 19!8__. and on the same day of each successive month thereafter, or as indicated
in space below.
'
;_\ ; ~(
.'.
' .i '•\
.. .

'

\.

.

• '

\

l

l
I

Any instalment which is more than· twice the amount of an otherwise reg~larly sche_duled equal instalment is a BALLOON PAYMENT. Unless the prope~y described in this contract is (_
to be used primarily for agricultural or leasing purposes. buyer has the right to refinance the amount of any Balloon Payment at the time 1t 1s due without penalty and under terms

which shall be no less favorable to the buyer than the terms of the original sale. These provisions do not apply to the extent that the Payment Schedule is adjusted to the seasonal

or irregular-income of the buyer.
IL DEFAULT CHARGE IN EVENT OF LATE PAYMENT If any instalment is not paid within 10 days after it is due, buyer agrees to pay a delinquency charge equal ta 53 of the unpaid instalment
not to exceed $9 if property hereunder is purchased primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use.
l2. OfSCRIPTION OF SECURITY INTEREST Seller reta1n_
s a security_ 1_nteresi und er the U;;1!orm Comrnerc:a! Code ' !'! the property r1mnbed above and any proceeds to secure payment and
perlormanc& of buyer's obligation hereunder. including any add1t1onal indebtedness incurred as provided herein. and under any extensions or renewals hereof.

l

13. PREPAYMENT REBATE Upon prepayment in full buyer is entitled to a rebate of the Finaj}Ce Charge (Item 6) computed in accordance with the Rule of 78 if the obligation hereunder is
oricinally payable in 61 instalments or less; otherwise in accordance with the actuarial method. A minimum charge will be ret.ained in_determining the amount of the rebate as follows: $5 if the Amount Financed does not exceed $75; $7.50 when the Amount Financed exceeds $75. No rebate under $1 will be paid.
*Required Physical Damage Insurance
Insurance Company

~\

·1_ .

.•

~?\,:,'~

/0
•

~

Term·_ _ months

O $_ _ _ Deductib~e ~llision-and also select one of the lall~wing:
0 Full Comprehensive mcluding-Fir~·Theft and Com limed Additional Coverage
0 $_ _ _ Deductible Comprehensive including-Fire·Theft and Combined Additional Coverage
0 Fire-Theft and Combined, Additional Coverage
·
·1 Optional if desired-Towing and labor'. costs O
Rental Reimbursement O

}=

I

•--Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance
Insurance Compao/'\,1

~v& {h

Term:
Term:

O 36
O

.l~

months .or 36.000 mi(es. whichever occurs first

(

. O $25 Deductible

O

$50 O~ductible

··

O
....

$__ Oeducti~le

· ..

The insurance, if any, referred to in this contract does not include coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused to others.

Amrdln1 lo Ier ms and conditions nt lorlh I• policy or e1rtlftca11 of las11nac1 lss11d by lh1 l1sam as cbeck1d below 11d 11 "Notice DI Prapaud Creditor lnsaranca DI Lll1
of_Bayer" coatalned Oil reum of bayar's copy of contnct.
Bayer Propou~. For Uft lnsmru: The pmoa whosa um1 a;i,em on llne Abelow (co-boyer, If any. on 11111 B, when buyer Is a corporation partntrshlp).

°'

0 The Pradentbl IDS11ranca CampaaJ of America, Newm, New Jmey, 1mder Its Group PalicJ Ha. GL·l&a. The lnsurantt andtr said
fl'.OUP JOllcJ does not mer (I) tilt ~ayer Prnpasad for lift lns11n11C1 ff age &5 or man on the date of this contract or (10 suicide
withla one Jll3r lhmfrom. Uadar said UoUJI poficy, the maximum amount ol lns11nnct1 for this contract Is SlD,000 and the mu.Imam
auretale amoaat a1 lnsunnce lor this and 2111 other lnsf~ment c011trxt at the buyer Is S15,000.
·

BUYER'S AGE STATEMENT AND HEALTH DECLARATION (AppOcabfa When
lnsmnca Under Prvtlentlll Groap P1Jlty GL·l&O Is Prapasacf). .
Ap last birthday of Bayer ~d fllr Ure lasunncar 0 Uadn &5
..,

1

Cbzrie HIS Beta Aathorfnd In 4C Abon md
..J.... _ .

.

.
. . ~ · ..
.
I, rhe Buyer Proposed for Ufe IDSl!Ti?:a, aadentand lh;t thf l11Sm111C1 Is caly mibblt to a ~yer who makas th1 lollawln1 llKlanllons
to ladaai Pradenffal ID etrcct mth lnsmnte: I do hmbJ ded.. that within ll:t µst Ihm months (1) I han nat cunsulfed or been under
the e2r1 ot a doctor ar other przti!imr far canm, and (l) I hn1 not baa canfined In a hOSjlftal or other lastiflltf.m 1!9eause of any

condition Df the hurt. bnin, Jim, kldnen or l111ii. I hereby nthartza 111y Jhyskiu or hospilJI ro lllsclm II Pnldaolial ~ llformaUoa
coacmin& my melf'ial history prior to Iha data of lhls cntracL
Sl1nalun

Plf'""~-~--.,,,..._~__,.-=--__,,--__,_,._..,..,.,.....,_~~-------( Si 1n1 lure of Buyer Proposed for Ute Insurance)

Under pollCJ Of aban deslpa!ed Insurer, mulmum amoun
Of lnsuranct ander this contnct Is $49-9-S....O.O-~.

md mulmum aurecat1 amount af lnsannct andtt tbls an.

any other lnstJlmeat contract of lht buyer Is S l!> 000

NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO All CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST TH:
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHAU
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
.

Executed in quintuplicate, copy of which was delivered to, and receipt is acknowledged by, buyer, this,-....12,,..__day of_ _**9_ _ __,, 11.8-

Buyer

"\

__,.,..

~s In In~ ....;._·-

Seller
Slcns In Ink

,,,,.

-~ .~

...

.· •

:.,.;.-...

. ·.r-. ·~

·;. ·

snu.:A.nm

CE?'!mOtiT COUP uiY

The foregoing contract is hereby assigned under the terms of the "Seller's Recom·
mendation, Assignment and Guaranty (With Recourse)" on th~.erse..s1~·de.
/-~~//
/ .'' / / ;~.L
, / ·_1 . . . . .
Seller
By
(II Corp. or Partnership)
(Title)

The foregoing contract is hereby assigned under the terms or the "Seller's Recommenda·
tion and Assignment (Without Recourse or With Umited Recourse)" on the reverse side.
Seller

By

(II Corp. or Partnership)
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(Title)

J.

GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSl.i'lL\NCE

.

CQ\IP.~1'Y

CHICAGO ILLINOIS

1NOTICE OF PROPOSED CREDIT
i LIFE & DISA3:~,TY INSURANCE

· · (herein called •"the Compeny ..)

'1NSUR§Jl-D'5~~re1n caI19d"-Y au'•)

AGE

-·

19

(Hector M. M.:lrtinex

I

--

:nRE'• •".c1uss

8101 South 2200

1.

STATE

West Jordan. Utah

,GMAC
Sal~

'

~·Test

-:CITY

CREDITOR

ZIP COOE

GROUP POL.ICY NO.

P.O. BOX 25873
Lake City ,Utha

8416

~4125

TERM OF
INSURANCE
(MONTHS)

·-

MONTH

JCO·SIGNER \LIFE INSURANCE ONL. Y)

OAY

YEAR

AGE

!

t

- . n.a.

A536914

DATE OF INDEBTEDNESS'

84084

78

12

9

STREET AOORESS

,;a£.ONO BENEFICIARY

I

CERTIFICATE NUMBER

CITY

36
ZIP CODE

STATE

Estate
LIFE INSURANCE
COVERAGE
(ELECT ONE)
·:mGLE LIFE
JCINT LIFE

INITIA!.
AMOUNT

CHARGE

Cl $ 97 .40

0

s 4995.00

1Maximum age: cannot exceed age 69
ia; the scheduled maturity data of
.indebtedness.
IL.IENHOLCER (if dlffer-ent from Creditorl

TOTAL DISABILITY INSURANCE
MOPHHLY
WAITING PERIOD
BENEFIT

~tfARG£

s 189 .81

BENEFITS ARE PAYABLE AFTER 14
DAYS.COMMENCING WITH THE 1st

$138.75

MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE
llFE INSURANCE
DISABILITY INSURANCE

S1s,ooo

I

MAXIMUM MONTHLY BENEFIT
(TOTAL DISABILITY)
$400.00

$15,000
I

DAY.

MAXIMUM TERM FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE
48 MONTHS

The Signer(s) of the contract hereby take(s) notice that group credit life insurance coverage and/or group credit accident and health insurance coverage will
be applicable to this contract if so marked on the front of the contract and each such type_ of coverage will be written by the insurance company named
above. This insurance, subject to acceptance by the insurer covers only the person(s) signing the request for such insurance. The amount of charge is indicated
for each type of credit insurance to be purchased. The term of insurance will commence as of the date the indebtedness is incurred and will expire on the
date 15 days after the original scheduled. maturity date of the indebtedness. Subject to acceptance by the insurer and within 30 days, there will be delivered
to the insured debtor a certificate of insurance more fully describing the insurance. In the event of prepayment of the indebtedness, a refund of insurance
charges will be made where due.
Applicant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Witness - - - - - - - - - - - - - - D • t • - - - - - - - - - - - - - Co·Signer _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
LIMITATION OF COVERAGES
• EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of coverage is tha date you becomi obligated to the Creditor (shown above as the "Date of Indebtedness").
, ;.tAXIMUM AGE: No person is eligible for this insurance if on or before the scheduled maturity data of indebtedness, such person will have passed the age of
SS, unless such indebtedness results from the renewal or refinancing of all indebtedness for which such person was previously insured by the above group
:ciicy.

PERSONS INSURED: If single life insurance is elected, only you are insured in the event of death. If joint life insurance is elected. both you and your
=a-signer are insured in the event of death. Joint life insurance will pay only one death benefit. If a death benefit is paid, as a result of your death or the death
of your co-signer, no insurance will thereafter be in effect under this cenificate. If your death and your co-signer's death occur simultaneously, one death
oenefit will be paid for your death only.
Ii disability insurance is elected. only you are insured in tha event of total disability and ·only if you are gainfully employed for compensation for at least
tn1rty hours per week on the effective date of coverage.
1 No person is eligible for any insurance hereunder if such person is a corporation, association or pannership.
• EXCLUSIONS: NO INSURANCE IS PROVIDED HEREUNDER: IF DEATH RESULTS FROM SUICIDE, WHETHER SANE OR INSANE, WITHIN ONE
YEAR FOLLOWING THE DATE OF INDEBTEDNESS. IF DISABILITY RESULTS FROM (a) NORMAL PREGNANCY; (b) INTENTIONALLY SELF·
INFLICTED INJURY WHILE SANE OR INSANE; (c) FLIGHT IN A NON-SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT; (d) WAR OR MILITARY SERVICE; (e) INJURY
SUSTAINED OR SICKNESS CONTRACTED FOR WHICH MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT WAS REQUIRED, OR WOULD HAVE CAUSED A
REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON TO HAVE SOUGHT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT WITHIN SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THIS CERTIFICATE ANO WHICH CAUSES A LOSS WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER SUCH EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE; PROVIDED,
I HOWEVER, THAT DISABILITY COMMENCING ·AFTER SIX MONTHS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE RESULTING FROM SUCH
' CONDITION SHALL BE COVERED.
~ ~ARTIAL LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE: ff the initial indebtedness exceeds.the maximum amount of life insurance permitted for an indebtedness on the
, ~ate. of the loan, the amount of indebtedness covered by the fife insurance throughout the term of the loan shall be the ratio of the maxim.um amount of
; ufe insurance shown above to the initial indebtedness and such ratio shall be established on the date of the indebtedness.
• OlSABILITY ~NS URAN CE LIMITS: The amount of Monthly Disability Benefit set fonh in the schedule may b~ I~ _than the ~~nthly installment payments
· necessary to discharge the unpaid indebtedness. In no event will the Company issue an amount of Monthly 01sab1hty Benefit in excess of t~e lesser of (a)
: maximum monthly benefit set fonh in the schedule, (b) the initial indebtedness. d~~ed by the number of monthly payQ and (c) an.._\\ount which
' would result In aggregate
monthly disability payments of $15,000.
~~ _ ~ \
~ \(])
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